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Abstract
The contribution of this paper is to revisit the Early Warning System (EWS) literature 
by analysing selected episodes of financial market crisis, i.e. those preceded by a spell 
of credit and real estate expansions. The aim is to disentangle instances when this 
constitutes a natural phenomenon associated with a process of financial development 
and innovation from those where it constitutes a worrisome signal. We identify 
economic variables that have leading indicator properties, thus helping to distinguish 
between “benign” episodes from those likely ending with downward pressures on the 
exchange rate or even a fully-fledged banking crisis. We find that a large current 
account deficit, a fall in price competitiveness, strong real growth and high public 
debt-to-GDP ratio increase the probability that a lending or housing boom would be 
accompanied by financial market tensions shortly after the peak. 
Keywords: Early warning system, financial crises, house prices, credit booms 
JEL Classification: E32, F31, F37 5
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Non technical summary 
 
Even just narrowing the attention to Europe the rapid growth of credit and housing prices have been a 
widespread phenomenon over recent years. This has featured in several central, eastern and south-eastern countries 
and was particularly evident in the Baltics. Although the stock of credit relative to GDP started from a very low 
base, this ratio rose sizeably over the period 2000 to 2007 from 19 to 90 percent in Latvia, 30 to 100 percent in 
Estonia or 7 to 35 percent in Romania. At the same time, residential prices increased, in real terms, by 16 percent in 
Latvia, 19 percent in Slovenia, 30 percent in Slovakia and Turkey and almost tripled in Romania, from 2002 to 
2007. Spain, Ireland, the UK have also seen rapid growth in credit aggregates and/or real estate prices before the 
ongoing financial turmoil took grips of the world economy. 
A key question for the policy maker is whether instances of credit and housing booms constitute natural 
phenomena associated with a process of financial development and innovation or should be worrisome. In this paper 
we try to provide some answers by reviewing the evidence on the basis of past experiences over the period 1980 to 
2008. 
The analysis can be embedded in the literature on Early Warning System (EWS) models that has flourished 
in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, which aimed at assessing countries’ vulnerability to a financial crisis. We 
propose a different approach to EWS models by focusing only on special instances of financial market pressures, i.e. 
those preceded by a domestic credit or real estate sector boom. We aim at capturing and quantifying leading 
indicators that may have a more muted signalling power when a sample of heterogeneous crisis episodes is 
considered. The specificity of this approach lies in the fact that information about the deterioration in the 
fundamentals or asset price variation is extracted only from boom periods.  
Technically, we start by choosing two main indicators of financial excesses for lending and housing prices. 
We identify booms and bust episodes for both indicators using a simplified Bry-Boschan algorithm, taken from the 
business-cycle literature. We then date large pressures in currency markets as well as banking crises. Putting 
together this information we disentangle boom episodes that were followed by episodes of financial tensions (either 
in the foreign exchange market or affecting the banking sector) and those that were resolved without any major 
consequences.  
The final step consists in estimating a fixed effect logistic model which links the probability that a peak in 
lending or housing prices triggers a crisis within a given time period, to the evolution of a set of fundamentals. 
External imbalances (current account balance-to-GDP ratio), real effective exchange rate variation and public debt-
to-GDP ratio best predict lending booms that result in financial market pressures. Sizeable credit and house prices 
growth as well as large currency appreciations increase the probability that a housing boom is likely to be followed 
by financial market tensions. Overall, this approach seems to help predict events of financial distress events rather 
well: by using a standard 10 percent signal threshold, when the boom is defined in terms of credit or housing prices, 
the model picks 90 and 81 percent of episodes of financial pressures respectively, although false alarms are also 
high at 83 and 68 percent respectively. This tool is complementary to expert analysis for quantifying country risks 
during lending or housing booms. 
 6
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Financial crises never seem to repeat themselves twice in the same way, as the world keeps finding new 
ways to generate them (Krugman, 1999: 471). At the same time financial crises are so disruptive that continuous 
efforts are made to identify commonalities among different episodes of financial turmoil. The ultimate aim is to 
draw lessons and design the appropriate policy responses to prevent new crises from erupting. One could argue, for 
example, that a common feature among the crises in Latin America in the 1980s, in the Scandinavian countries in 
1992, Mexico in 1994, and South-East Asia in 1997-98 was the weaknesses of the regulatory financial systems in 
managing large inflows of foreign savings. All the above cases, besides resulting in periods of sustained exchange 
rate weakness or a fully fledged banking crisis, were preceded by a prolonged spell of excessive credit creation 
granted to the private sector, which in some cases was also linked to the presence of institutional distortions created 
by public explicit and implicit safety nets. 
The over lending pattern in presence of large capital inflows and concerns over sudden stop phenomena are 
key issues policy makers are confronted with, as the accumulation of credit creation encourages the financing of 
unproductive activities or spurs excessive household consumption and may be ultimately accompanied by a large 
housing boom. These developments may be rationalised in terms of greater market access to world capital markets, 
although a point could be reached whereby a bubble develops which, ex-post at least, appears self-evident.  
  This paper was originally motivated by the observation of rapid credit growth and fast rising real estate 
prices in some European countries, particularly in central eastern and south-eastern Europe. Albeit the stock of 
credit relative to GDP started from a very low base in all these countries, the ratio rose sizeably over the period 2000 
to 2007 in several countries, on average, by around 15% in Estonia, 21% in Lithuania, 25% in Bulgaria and Latvia 
(see Figures 1a-b). 
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Similar phenomena were taking place also in some Asian, Latin American countries, South Africa etc. The 
question facing policy makers in circumstances such as these is to what extent financial deepening, favourable 
external financing conditions, and improved medium-term prospects could justify the underlying developments; or 
policy makers should rather come to the opposite conclusion that the economy is overheated, bringing the discussion 7
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to the next (equally difficult) level of whether corrective measures are required. In this paper our perspective is 
clearly at the country level, although the recent financial turmoil experience has shown the important spillover risks 
associated to housing and lending booms for the world economy.    
 
Even if frequently de-emphasised in “good years” the underlying economic debate is not new:  
(i) on the one hand, the economic literature has shown that promoting credit markets through an improved 
allocation of capital enhances economic development (King and Levine, 1993, 1994). By reducing the costs for 
external finance, financial deepening spurs economic growth especially in countries that have already reached a 
minimum threshold of financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). 
Empirical results point to positive effects on growth only if the countries in process of liberalising their financial 
sector are already at a sufficiently advanced stage of economic development and have no major macroeconomic 
misalignments (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001, Edwards, 2001). Moreover, the quality of the institutional 
framework and regulatory system in which the financial liberalisation process takes place limits the emergence of 
negative externalities in the form of sudden stops and international financial crises (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  
(ii) on the other hand, the economic literature has shown that periods of excessive asset prices growth, 
either lending or housing prices “booms”, could lead to episodes of fully fledged financial crises, financial distress 
or protracted periods of economic slowdown.
1 Theoretically, the link between credit booms and crises has found an 
explanation in the financial accelerator of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or in the moral hazard explanations of the 
over-lending cycle fuelled by large capital inflows and excessive liquidity of the financial system (McKinnon and 
Pill (1996)). There it is argued that in an environment whereby the possibility of bank bailout encourages moral 
hazard on both the supply and demand sides of credit, consumption booms and current account deficits are likely to 
take place. Boom-bust cycles in asset prices have been documented empirically in the literature on third-generation 
crises as the common cause of both banking and currency crises (McKinnon and Pill, 1996, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999). 
The crises affecting the emerging markets in the 1990s have stimulated several researchers looking for 
ways to explain and predict crises. The academic literature on financial crises has flourished and several models to 
predict the occurrence of financial crises were developed. One major approach to building an Early Warning System 
is the signalling approach proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). Country-specific crises thresholds 
are derived for a large set of indicators, relating the external position, the financial sector, the real sector, the 
institutional structure and fiscal policy. Whenever the value of the indicator is higher than the threshold, a crisis 
signal is issued. If a crisis follows within 24 months, the signal is shown as having good predictive power, otherwise 
the signal is viewed as “noise”. The optimal set of thresholds is set so as to minimise the noise-to-signal ratio.  
The alternative approach consists in the use of discrete choice techniques to assess the probability of a 
crisis based on a set of indicators. As showed by Berg and Pattillo (1999b), a simple probit model outperforms the 
signalling approach in terms of out-of-sample predictions. However, as it turns out, the results are highly dependent 
                                                 
1 In the literature on the costs of financial crises (e.g. Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003), the higher the speed of credit growth in the 
run-up to the crises, the more disruptive its effects on the real economy.  8
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on the way crisis episodes are defined.
2 A major element to be considered is that the nature of financial crises is not 
taken into account in the canonical EWS literature. This a major drawback considering that, as the currency crisis 
literature emphasises, not all crises have common origins or are driven by macroeconomic disequilibria given the 
role of psychological self-fulfilling factors and/or contagion. Aggregating and pooling countries and crises together 
might lead to a loss of information that could affect the estimated parameters.  
In this paper our main contribution is to explore a modified approach to EWS models by focusing 
exclusively on the financial distress episodes preceded by a boom in domestic credit and asset prices, in particular in 
the real estate sector. We believe there could be merit in narrowing the search and leave aside other episodes, 
especially those where self-fulfilling expectations, contagion and spillover effects reduce the researcher’s ability to 
forecast crises, as argued by Berg and Patillo (1999a). 
The way we proceed is as follows. We first identify booms and bust episodes for each country and 
construct a large panel of data, compiling only the boom periods. We then date large swings in the currency markets 
and banking crises. Putting together this information we split boom episodes that were followed by financial 
tensions from those that were resolved without any major consequences. The final step consists in estimating a fixed 
effect logistic model that estimates the probability that a peak in lending or housing prices triggers a crisis as a 
function of a set of fundamentals.
3 This framework can be extended out-of sample for countries that never 
experienced instances of instability due to financial excesses. As such it can be used to gauge the probability that 
booming countries might experience pressures in the currency markets or a fully-fledged banking crisis shortly after 
the peak.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data. In Section 3 we 
pressures in terms of large currency swings and banking crises. In Section 5 we combine the information from the 
previous two sections and identify the boom episodes that are followed by financial pressures. In Section 6 we use a 
variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators that the literature has identified as having leading indicators 
properties of financial crises and perform a fixed effects logistic estimation for both credit-to-GDP growth and 
house prices series. In Section 7 we present the in-sample results of the signal extraction methodology and derive an 




  Our analysis is based on annual data. To identify lending booms we construct credit to GDP ratios using 
bank lending data and nominal GDP in domestic currency from the International Financial Statistics (IFS, Line 32d) 
and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases respectively. These series are jointly available for 174 countries. To 
compute growth rates in house prices we rely on different sources. For advanced economies we employ data from 
                                                 
2 More generally, Bussière and Fratzscher (2006) highlight the presence of a post-crisis bias that lowers the predictive power of 
any given EWS. To tackle this problem, they propose to consider a post-crisis regime, such that the crisis variable equals “zero” 
in normal times, “one” before and during the crisis and “two” in post-crisis periods.  
3 A fixed effects logistic model on pooled data seems therefore more appropriate than the signalling approach to capture events 
that are in the tail of a distribution, as noticed by Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin (2003). Also see van den Berg, Candelon and 
Urbain (2008) on the use of panel models to predict financial crises. 
identify boom and bust episodes in credit and real estate markets in our sample. In Section 4 we date financial 
2. Data availability   9
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OECD Main Economic Indicators (Housing prices index from CPI components) and Eurostat (residential property 
prices of existing dwellings). For emerging markets we rely on Haver Analytics, which in turns provides series 
directly from national sources.
4 Overall the data coverage allows us to include housing data for a set of 66 countries 
(using the criterion that at least 5 years of data must be available for each country). To detect currency pressures, we 
construct an indicator based on the nominal effective exchange rate variation and total reserves minus gold, both 
series being available from the IFS (Line neu and ll.d, respectively). This indicator is available for 109 countries, 
spanning the period from 1980 to 2008. To identify banking crises, we employ the results of existent studies of 
banking crises as compiled in the Annex of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
5 
  To compile the required set of macroeconomic fundamentals we rely on a number of variables from the 
WEO database, i.e. current account positions, public deficit, public debt, real growth and CPI data while the real 
effective series is taken from the IFS (Line reu). Among the considered indicators the ones constraining the most the 
sample are public deficit and public debt, reducing the number of countries to 76.
6  
 
3. Identification of boom episodes in credit and real estate markets 
 
The starting point for the analysis is to identify peaks and troughs for two series of economic exuberance 
for the period 1980 to 2008, stacking all available countries in a panel. Our analysis focuses on two economic 
indicators (i) credit to the private sector-to-GDP expressed in growth rates and (ii) house prices’ growth rates.
  
Credit typically grows more rapidly than GDP as the economy develops- a process known as financial 
deepening. Already 40 years ago Goldsmith (1969) remarked that the level of financial intermediation moved in 
tandem with the level of development of an economy. Beyond financial deepening, credit can temporarily expand 
more rapidly than GDP because firms’ investment and the requirements for working capital —i.e., funds needed to 
pay in advance for production inputs — are procyclical. In some emerging market countries, working capital can 
constitute a large part of total credit, as showed by Tornell and Westermann (2003). The risks to the financial system 
have been found to be associated empirically more to the rate of increase than the level of credit-to-GDP 
(Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000, Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche, 2001). Growth in housing prices is also said 
to be a crucial measure for identifying periods of economic exuberance, as the economic literature has increasingly 
recognised (see Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009, Detken and Alessi, 2009 for recent studies).  
                                                 
4 We selected the most comprehensive indicator, mainly CPI category Housing, or if not available as such, Housing and 
household operations/ Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels. 
5 Among these studies they consider in particular, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), Jácome (2008), Jonung and Hagberg (2002), Reinhart (2002), Bordo et al. (2001). For more recent instances of 
turmoil, we have adopted the criterion of defining a banking crisis the situation where the IMF assistance or government bailout 
was required.  
6 The countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, The Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Moldova, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grens, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay. 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1094
September 2009
To identify boom-busts periods in both credit-to-GDP growth and house prices growth, we use a Bry-
Boschan algorithm used by the NBER since the 1970s to date recessions. This is standard in the business-cycle 
literature from the early paper by Burns and Mitchell onwards (1946).
7 The turning points identified in the series of 
credit-to-GDP and house prices (expressed as growth rates) marks the shifts from phases of boom and bust. This 
methodology imposes a strict succession alternating peaks and troughs by taking out irrelevant local extreme points. 
Given the aims of our paper we keep in the sample only the boom years, as long as the ascending period lasts for at 
least three years, removing from our sample all other observations. 
 
4. Dating currency and banking crises 
 
The next step requires dating large currency swings and banking crises. For the former, we follow an 
approach that is common in the EWS literature. Following Sachs et al. (1996), we define a market pressure index as 


































  (1) 
The choice of these two terms in the index is standard reflecting the notion that monetary authorities may respond to 
a speculative attack in the foreign exchange market by selling reserves; hence the pressure may not be apparent from 
movements in the exchange rate. In the above expression  e σ  denotes the standard deviation of the nominal 
effective exchange rate 3-month variation and  R σ  the standard deviation of the 3-month rate of change of total 
reserves over the period 1980 to 2008 to account for the different volatility in the two series. 
We identify pressures in the currency markets for those months when the exchange market pressure index 







otherwise   if   ,




t i isis CurrencyCr   (2) 
    
 
5. Combining the information: booms followed or not by a crisis  
 
As discussed earlier, the specificity of our approach is to develop a tool assessing the likelihood that booms may 
eventually lead to episodes of financial crisis. Figure 2 illustrates how the final dataset is constructed combining the 
information on booms and crises. The grey area denotes the bust years, i.e. the data excluded from our sample. We 
follow the convention that vertical lines denote the year of turbulence in the exchange market (dotted lines) or the 
beginning of a banking crisis (dashed lines).  
 
                                                 
7 The initial idea of Burns and Mitchell (1946) was later implemented through the multi-step Bry-Boschan (1971) algorithm, 
mainly used for the analysis of economic cycles (NBER) but also more recently transposed to equity (Harding and Pagan, 2002) 
or commodity prices (Cashin, McDermott and Scott, 1999). In our case the methodology is simplified as annual data avoids the 
adjustment requirements due to seasonality factors. For alternative methods see Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004).  11
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We have two peaks in this example, the first that turns out to be benign (denoted as point B), the second one malign 
(point M) as is followed for example by a banking crisis within two years. We proceed by assigning to our 
indicators of exuberance a value equal to 1 for points such as M and zero to all other points in the sample.
8 
 

















As an illustration, let us review a number of past episodes of credit booms (see Figures 3a-b below) for the cases of 
Thailand and Finland.  Thailand became increasingly outward-oriented and integrated into global trade and finance 
starting from the 1980s. In our sample a peak in lending took place in 1983, which led to a banking crisis in the 
same year followed by devaluation in 1985.
9 A new boom in credit started building up immediately thereafter 
leading to two further peaks, one in 1990 and one in 1994. Only the latter was followed by financial turmoil, i.e. a 
fully-fledged banking crisis in 1996 (see Bordo et al., 2001, Reinhart, 2002 and Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996) on the 
eve of the Asian currency crisis.  
 















































                                                 
8 To improve the predictive power of this modelling strategy, we only considered episodes of booms followed by financial crisis 
with an additional constraint: that the indicator of exuberance is positive at least for two years prior to the peak.  
9 Other devaluation episodes took place in that period but were not preceded by booms in credit so they are not included here. 12
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Figure 3b also illustrates an example of a European country, the case of Finland, for which we identify two peaks in 
1988 and 1991. While the first had no consequences, the second was followed by financial tensions manifesting as a 
banking crisis starting in 1991 and pressures on the exchange rate for three years, in the form of devaluations prior 
to the abandonment of ERM or depreciations.  
 
Finally, we illustrate two past episodes of house prices booms, which took place one in UK and the other in 
Iceland (see Figures 4a-b). We identified for the case of the UK three booms, the first that was not followed by 
financial pressures (in 1985), the second and the third leading instead to tensions in the banking sector and 
downward pressures on the pound in 1991 and 2006 (twin crisis). The case of Iceland also foresees two housing 
peaks in 2000 and 2005, only the latter leading to a twin crisis within our two-year window.  














































These episodes are just a few examples of periods of exuberance in credit and housing markets that were followed 
by pressures on the currency or banking sector. The full dataset of peaks in credit-to-GDP and house price growth 
for our sample of countries is available in Appendix 1, reporting all the episodes of currency or banking crisis as 
long as they occurred within two years from the peak. In the next section we look for economic indicators that may 
help us to investigate more formally the likelihood of financial crisis episodes in the aftermath of a boom. 
 
6. Indicators of vulnerability to a financial crisis 
 
  The existent literature has identified several possible indicators of vulnerability for currency/banking crises 
that are already apparent in the boom phase. We refer in particular to the studies by Kamisky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
(1998), Goldstein, Kaminsky, Reinhart (2000) and Bussière and Fratzscher (2006). Our choice of macroeconomic 
fundamentals resembles closely that literature. The first variable that we include is the rate of change of the real 
effective exchange rate to proxy - albeit imperfectly – a large deterioration in price competitiveness, which may 
have a destabilising role on the financial system. We also include the current account as a share of GDP, as beyond 
its competitiveness relevance, it may also signal to what extent a country is reliant on external financing. In the 
domain of the domestic real and public sector, our chosen indicators are standard, i.e. real GDP growth, fiscal 
balance and public debt to GDP ratios. In the domestic financial sector domain, we follow the literature and include 
domestic credit to the private sector-to-GDP and house prices both expressed in growth rates. We also attempted to 13
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include other indicators of external exposure, such as short-term debt over total reserves and net foreign assets as a 
ratio of GDP but they turned out to be either statistically insignificant or constraining our sample excessively.  
 
6. 1 Signals extracted for booms identified with credit data  
 
Table 1 reports the standard output for the conditional fixed-effects logistic regression for the case of booms defined 
in terms of credit data.  
  
Table 1: Results of the Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression on credit-to-GDP data. Initial sample 1981-
2008.  
 
Variables Coef.  Std. Err. 
Credit-to-GDP growth (-1)  27.15***  8.53 
Credit-to-GDP growth (-2)  14.80***  5.22 
Current Account balance (-2)  -23.14*  13.08 
REER variation (-1)  14.28**  5.63 
Real growth rate (-2)  11.49  12.92 
Public Debt-to-GDP ratio (-2)  5.14**  2.41 
Number of obs = 174; Group variable: country;Number of groups = 18; Obs per group: min = 5; avg = 9.7; max =  20 
LR chi2 (6) = 45.87; Log likelihood  = -20.61;  Prob > chi2  =  0.00; Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -43.55   Log-Lik Full Model: -20.61 
D (12): 41.22; LR (6): 45.87; Prob > LR:  0.000; McFadden's R2: 0.53; McFadden's Adj R2:  0.39; ML (Cox-Snell) R2: 0.92;   
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2: 0.93; Count R2:  0.50  
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
Our choice of specification comes from a general to specific approach, i.e. reducing the number of 
variables and lags based both on statistical as well as economic considerations. We find that credit to GDP growth, 
the current account balance-to-GDP ratio, the change in the real effective exchange rate and the public debt to GDP 
ratios are all statistically significant and enter with the expected sign in the logistic regression. In particular, the 
probability that the reversal in the credit boom would lead to tensions in the foreign exchange market or in the 
banking sector is higher the larger the current account deficit and public debt to GDP indebtedness. High real output 
growth during the boom also enhances the likelihood of a crisis. The coefficient is not significant, possibly because  
robust growth is not always evidence of economic overheating.  
For each year and country in the sample, the model provides a “fitted probability” i.e. the probability that a 
boom in credit would result in financial tensions (in the form of pressures on the exchange rate or a banking crisis) 
within a time span of two years after the turning point. The fitted probability can then be used to assess the 
effectiveness of our EWS framework in correctly predicting crises stemming from financial excesses.
10 The typical 
convention is that a signal is issued when the model-based fitted probability goes beyond the 10 or 20 percent 
thresholds. A false alarm or “noise” denotes a situation instead whereby a signal is issued and is not accompanied by 
an episode of financial pressures within two years after the turning point. Table 2 summarises the predictive 
performance of the model specified on credit over GDP growth rate, for the 10 and 20 percent thresholds.  
 
 
                                                 
10 See Bussière (2007) on the limits of static specifications in timing the crisis signal sent by the leading indicators. 14
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10% 162  28  134  20  18 
% Well signalled boom crises   90% 
False signals % total signals    83% 







analysed*    
20% 112  21  91  20  16 
% Well signalled boom crises  80% 
False signals % total signals   81%   
 
Taking into account (i) our definitions of booms (ii) data availability for economic fundamentals and (iii) the 
identified financial crises in our sample we find 20 instances of booms followed by financial tensions within a time 
span of two years after the peak. Imposing for example a 10 percent probability threshold criterion, 162 signals are 
issued, 28 are well signalled at the cost of 134 false alarms.
11 This is a reminder of the several instances in which 
booms are not synonymous of pending financial crises.  
Of the 20 instances where tensions are identified, the model anticipates 18. Imposing a 20 percent 
probability threshold to reduce the overall signals to 112 has a cost, since only 16 of the 20 episodes are anticipated. 
From a policy-making perspective, as in the standard EWS literature, a large number of false alarms is the price to 
incur to predict the large majority of financial crisis in the precise time span of two years.
12 The analysis is 
nevertheless useful, pointing to those economic fundamentals that help preserve a boom from turning “malign”. As 
it turns out, current account surpluses, low public debt, sustainable output and credit growth as well as avoiding 
appreciating real exchange rates help prevent instances of turmoil. 
 
6.2 Signals extracted for booms identified with house prices  
 
Analogous results can also be presented for booms identified with house growth rates. The results of the fixed 
effects logistic analysis on house prices data are presented in Table 3.  
The results show that, beyond house prices growth, strong credit expansion during the boom phase increases the 
probability that the turning point in house prices will be followed by financial tensions.
13 Sizeable appreciations in 
real effective exchange rates are similarly having an adverse impact. Both the current account-to-GDP ratio and real 




                                                 
11 There are in some case multiple signals for the same episode of a peak followed by market pressures.  
12 To increase the number of observations we have bundled together banking crises and instances of exchange rate pressures. If 
we apply the analysis separately, we find that (i) a deterioration of credit growth or (ii) larger current account deficits (iii) 
sizeable exchange rate appreciations are more important factors in explaining the likelihood of credit boom episodes being 
followed by banking crisis rather than by pressures in foreign exchange markets.  
13 On the importance of credit as indicator for detecting asset price misalignments, see Gerdesmeier, Reimers and Roffia (2009). 15
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Table 3: Results of the Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression on house prices data. Initial sample 1981-2008.  
 
Variables Coef.  Std. Err. 
House prices growth (-1)  25.62***  7.67 
Credit-to-GDP growth (-2)  4.95*  2.71 
Current Account balance (-1)  -0.39  10.13 
Current Account balance (-2)  -3.03  8.48 
REER variation (-2)  10.69**  5.28 
Real growth rate (-2)  3.57  11.28 
Number of obs = 211; Group variable: country; Number of groups = 21; Obs per group: min = 4; avg = 10.0; max = 17; 
LR chi2 (5) = 32.60; Log likelihood  = -38.19; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log-Lik Intercept Only:-54.50; Log-Lik Full Model: -38.19; 
D (15): 76.389; LR (6):  32.60;  Prob > LR:  0.00; McFadden's R2: 0.30; McFadden’s Adj R2: 0.19;ML (Cox-Snell) R2: 0.79;   
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2:  0.79; Count R2: 0.52;                       
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
For completeness, entirely analogously to before, Table 4 reports the predictive performance of the optimal set of 
vulnerability indicators identified on housing data for both the 10 and 20 percent crisis thresholds.  
 
Table 4: Predictive performance of the model –crises occurring within two years from the moment a signal is issued. 











10% 117  37  80  26  22 
% Well signalled boom crises   81% 
False signals % total signals    68% 







analysed*    
20% 67  22  45  26  16 
% Well signalled boom crises 
False signals % total signals   67%   
 
The bottom line is unchanged. To capture the majority of peaks followed by a crisis, one has to incur in a high 
likelihood that the end of a boom would lead to financial tensions depend on these indicators of imbalances.   
 
7 Applications of the EWS 
 
7.1. In-sample predictions 
 
There is another neat way of presenting the predicting performance of the EWS model. We rank the 20 episodes of 
credit and the 26 episodes of housing booms that turned “malign” in terms of the estimated probability provided by 
the logit models. Let us start again with the case of credit booms. The first three columns of Table 5 report the years 
when (i) the peak in lending took place (ii) financial market tensions manifested themselves (iii) the signal was 
issued. The fourth and final column reports the corresponding estimated probability.  
 
number of false alarms. The point remains that the vulnerability indicators have information content, i.e. the 
62% 16
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Table 5: Episodes of booms in credit-to-GDP growth followed by downward exchange rate pressures 
and/or banking crises –in sample predictions 
 
Country  Credit peaks  
Year of sizeable 
currency swing (a) 
or banking crisis (b) 
Year where the 
signal was issued 
Model-based 
probability for the 
year where the 
signal was issued  
Banking crises/major currency swings predicted at the 20 % threshold 
Burundi  2000  2002(a) 2000  0.92 
Canada  2006  2008(a)  2006  0.26 
Cyprus  1999  2000(a)  1997, 1998, 1999  0.23, 0.30, 0.28 
Croatia  2006  2008(a)  2004, 2006  0.67, 0.l3 
Denmark  1987  1987(b), 1989(a)  1987  0.98 
Ecuador  1993  1994-95(b)  1991, 1992, 1993  0.44, 0.26, 0.28 
Finland 1991 
1991-92-93(a), 
1991(b)  1990, 1991  0.35, 0.19 
Italy  1992  1992-93(a)  1991, 1992  0.43, 0.33 
Japan  1987 1989(a)  1987 0.82 
New Zealand  1988  1988(a)  1987, 1988  0.30, 0.69 
Norway  1986 1986(a),  1988(b)  1986 0.88 
Saudi  Arabia  1993 1993-94(a)  1993 0.94 
Trinidad&Tobago  1997 1997-99(a)  1997 0.87 
Uganda  1993 1994(b)  1993 0.73 
Banking crises/major currency swings predicted at the 10 % threshold 
Austria  1989 1991(a)  1989 0.11 
Grenada  2000  2002(a)  1999, 2000  0.19, 0.37 
South Africa  1984  1984-86(a)  1984  0.14 
South  Africa  1998 1998(a)  1998 0.12 
Banking crises/major currency swings not predicted by the model 
Dominican Rep.  1996  1996(b)     
Norway 1998  1998(a)      
 
In some cases the signal was issued for a number of consecutive years, with the predicted probability of a crisis 
changing over those years. The findings are intuitive: the downward pressures on the Japanese yen in 1989, the  
devaluation of the Finnish markka in 1991, the exit of a number of European currencies from ERM in 1992, 
the financial market tensions taking grip of the Northern European countries in the 1980s (Norway, 1986 and 
Denmark, 1987) are all included with high probability. Other cases are captured when the threshold is reduced to 
10 percent and therefore predicted only if the policy maker is prepared to accept a larger number of false signals. 
 
A similar story emerges when investigating the case of malign booms in house prices growth rates (see 
Table 6). A number of well-know episodes are predicted, for example the Philippine peso devaluation in 1984, the 
Swedish banking and currency crisis in 1991-92, the pressures on the UK banking sector and on the pound sterling 
in 1991-92, the sharp fall in the Icelandic króna in 2006. As a reminder of the limitations of any methodology based 
on backward looking phenomena, the signal for the 2006 housing peak in the UK stands at 8 percent, lower than our 
10 percent threshold, therefore it is not, in our definition, a boom-crisis example. This could be ascribed to (i) choice 
of fundamentals that may not capture for example the excessive risks taken by the banking sector (ii) data 
limitations (iii) the role of global financial interlinkages that appear to have dominated the recent turmoil. However, 
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and/or banking crises –in sample predictions 
 
Country  House price peak  
Year of sizeable 
currency swing (a) 
or banking crisis (b) 
Year where the 
signal was issued 
Model-based  
probability for the 
year where the 
signal was issued  
Banking crises/major currency swings predicted at the 20 % threshold 
Austria  1983  1984(a) 1983  0.31 
Canada 1990  1992(a) 1990  0.28 
Finland  1989  1991(a), 1991(b)  1989  0.64 
Germany 1992  1993(a)  1992  0.60 
Greece  1991  1991(b)  1991  0.76 
Israel 1984  1984(a)  1984  1 
Japan  1991  1992(b)  1989, 1990  0.29, 0.30 
New Zealand  1987  1988(a), 1987(b)  1986, 1987  0.30, 0.61 
Paraguay 2001  2001(a),  2001(b)  2001  0.47 
Spain  1993  1993(a)  1991, 1992  0.16, 0.12 
Sweden  1991  1992-93(a), 1991(b)  1990, 1991  0.19, 0.54 
Banking crises/major currency swings predicted at the 10 % threshold 
Australia  1988  1989(b)  1986  0.18 
Belgium  1992  1993(a)  1990, 1991, 1992  0.18, 0.24, 0.28 
Denmark  1988  1989(a)  1987, 1988  0.11, 0.53 
Iceland 2005  2006(a),  2007(b)  2005  0.21 
Norway  1988  1988(b)  1986, 1987, 1988  0.10, 0.16, 0.41 
Philippines 1984  1984(a)  1984  0.15 
Singapore  1985  1986(a)  1984, 1985  0.25, 0.25 
Singapore 1997  1998-99(a)  1997  0.10 
United Kingdom  1991  1992(a), 1991(b)  1990, 1991  0.18, 0.16 
United States  1985  1987(a)  1984, 1985  0.11, 0.14 
Banking crises/major currency swings not predicted by the model 
Italy 1990 1992(a),  1990(b)     
Italy 1994 1995(a)     
Norway 2002  2003(a)    
United Kingdom   2006  2008(a), 2007(b)     




7.2. Out-of-sample predictions 
 
The framework that we have developed has a particularly interesting application out-of sample. Whenever 
an upward movement is identified in our indicators (either credit or housing prices), we are in a boom situation that 
will eventually reverse. Using our estimated equations allows us to calculate the probability that a crisis will erupt 
once the boom is reversed.
14 Given the initial motivation of this paper, we calculate such probabilities for the case of 
Central and Eastern Europe economies (see Table 7), which did not experience in their recent history a credit or 







                                                 
14 This is based on the assumption that fundamentals will have remained unchanged at the peak. As the boom progresses they 
typically deteriorate unless policy actions are taken. 
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Country Year  Point estimate  95% CI  Point estimate  95% CI 
2005 0.13  (0.05, 0.29)  0.21  (0.07, 0.49) 
2006 0.07  (0.03, 0.15)  0.18  (0.05, 0.47) 




  2008 0.12  (0.04, 0.34)  0.11  (0.02, 0.45) 
2005 0.03  (0.02, 0.06)  0.09  (0.05, 0.15) 
2006 0.04  (0.02, 0.06)  0.09  (0.05, 0.15) 




  2008 0.03  (0.02, 0.06)  0.12  (0.06, 0.21) 
2005 0.03  (0.01, 0.05)  0.08  (0.05, 0.15) 
2006 0.05  (0.03, 0.09)  0.09  (0.04, 0.18) 




  2008 0.05  (0.03, 0.10)  0.11  (0.05, 0.2113) 
2005 0.08  (0.04, 0.15)  0.10  (0.05, 0.18) 
2006 0.07  (0.03, 0.13)  0.13  (0.06, 0.23) 




  2008 0.07  (0.03, 0.15)  0.12  (0.04, 0.28) 
2005 0.05  (0.03, 0.07)  0.18  (0.09, 0.34) 
2006 0.05  (0.04, 0.08)  0.15  (0.07, 0.29) 




  2008 0.06  (0.04, 0.09)  0.11  (0.06, 0.21) 
2005 0.09  (0.05, 0.17)  0.08  (0.03, 0.18) 
2006 0.13  (0.06, 0.27)  0.12  (0.05, 0.26) 




  2008 0.05  (0.02, 0.13)  0.16  (0.05, 0.43) 
2005 0.10  (0.04, 0.20)  0.11  (0.04, 0.27) 
2006 0.15  (0.06, 0.30)  0.11  (0.06, 0.20) 




  2008 0.08  (0.04, 0.14)  0.09  (0.04, 0.20) 
2005 0.02  (0.01, 0.04)  0.04  (0.01, 0.12) 
2006 0.04  (0.03, 0.07)  0.07  (0.03, 0.14) 




  2008 0.04  (0.02, 0.07)  0.10  (0.05, 0.20) 
2005 0.05  (0.02, 0.12)  0.17  (0.06, 0.41) 
2006 0.07  (0.03, 0.15)  0.12  (0.05, 0.28) 




  2008 0.11  (0.04, 0.28)  0.21  (0.07, 0.50) 
2005 0.02  (0.01, 0.05)  0.09  (0.02 0.29) 
2006 0.05  (0.03, 0.09  0.12  (0.05, 0.27) 




  2008 0.05  (0.03, 0.11)  0.15  (0.05, 0.34)   
 
Several signals are issued if we content ourselves with a 10 percent threshold, almost none if this threshold is raised 
to 20 percent. Signals of similar magnitude are also found for several other non-European countries, underscoring 
how global this phenomenon has been. Despite the large number of false signals, the methodology developed here is 
helpful to quantify the risks associated to a boom phase. From a policy maker perspective an early warning, 19
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irrespective of whether the crisis materialises or not, is a call for corrective measures, signalling that the boom 
episode is characterised by macro imbalances.
15  
 
8 Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have taken a different approach from what is standard in the literature by focusing 
exclusively on the vulnerabilities of a country at the time of a boom in housing prices or bank lending. Like in the 
EWS literature, from a forecasting perspective a large number of false signals must be incurred to anticipate these 
episodes. This does not change however that there is information content in the identified fundamentals. Their 
deterioration might increase the chance that the end of a boom phase leads to pressures on the domestic currency or 
a fully-fledged banking crisis.  
A methodology quantifying the risks stemming from macro disequilibria is helpful, although expert 
analysis remains vital for it incorporates additional aspects, such as the degree of foreign exchange exposure, the 
health of the banking system, etc.  Several extensions to the present analysis may be conceivable, as for instance 
developing a more elaborate method for detecting booms (for example in terms of deviation from trend, peaks and 
trough on rolling averages, etc). Future research may also explore if the information content from lending and 
housing booms could not only help assess the probability of financial crises but also anticipate prolonged periods of 
economic slowdown.  
 
 
                                                 
15 A point emphasised in Bussière (2009). 20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1094
September 2009
References   
 
Agnello, L. and L. Schuknecht, 2009. Booms and Busts in Housing Markets. Determinants and Implications. ECB 
Working Paper 1071, July, Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank.  
Arteta, C., Eichengreen, B. and C. Wyplosz, 2001. When does Capital Account Liberalization Help More than It 
Hurts?, in B. Eichengreen, ed., Capital Flows and Crises (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press)  71–96. 
van den Berg, J., Candelon, B. and J.-P. Urbain, 2008. A Cautious Note on the Use of Panel Models to Predict 
Financial Crises. Economics Letters, 101 (1), 80-83.  
Berg, A. and C. Pattillo, 1999a. Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test. IMF Staff Papers 46(2), 107-138. 
Berg, A. and C. Pattillo, 1999b. Predicting Currency Crises: The Indicators Approach and an Alternative. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 18(4), 561-86. 
Bordo, M., Eichengreen, B., Klingebiel, D. and M.S. Martínez-Pería, 2001. Is the Crisis Problem Growing More 
Severe? Economic Policy 16, 51–82. 
Borio, C. and P. Lowe, 2002. Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus. BIS Working 
Paper 114, Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
Borio, C. and P. Lowe, 2004. Securing Sustainable Price Stability: Should Credit Come Back from the Wilderness? 
BIS Working Paper 157, Basel: Bank for International Settlements.  
Burns, A.F. and W.C. Mitchell, 1946. Measuring Business Cycles. NBER Book Series Studies in Business Cycles. 
Bussière, M., 2007. Balance of Payment Crises in Emerging Markets - How Early Were the “Early” Warning 
Signals? ECB Working Paper 713, January. 
Bussière, M., 2009. Methodological Issues in the Estimation of Early Warning Signals and Policy Implications, 
presentation at the “Early Warning Tools for Predicting Crises” Workshop, Brussels, 30 June 2009. 
Bussière, M. and M. Fratzscher, 2006. Towards a New Early Warning System of Financial Crises. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 25(6), 953-973.  
Cashin, P., McDermott, C. J. and A. Scott, 2002. Booms and Slumps in World Commodity Prices. Journal of 
Development Economics 69(1), 277-296. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, 1997. The Determinants of Banking Crises - Evidence from Developing and 
Developed Countries, IMF Working Papers 97/106, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, 1998. Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1917, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Detken C. and L. Alessi, 2009. Real Time Early Warning Indicators for Costly Asset Price Boom/Bust Cycles: A 
Role for Global Liquidity. ECB Working Paper 1039, March, Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank. 
Edwards, S., 2001. Does the Current Account Matter? NBER Working Papers 8275, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Eichengreen, B. and C. Arteta, 2000. Banking Crises in Emerging Markets: Presumptions and Evidence, Center for 
International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C00-115, University of California at 
Berkeley.  
García-Herrero, A., 1997. Banking Crises in Latin America in the 1990s: Lessons from Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Venezuela. IMF Working Paper 97/140, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Gerdesmeier, D., Reimers, H. and B. Roffia, 2009. Asset Price Misalignments and the Role of Money and Credit, 
ECB Working Paper 1068, July, Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank. 21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1094
September 2009
Goldsmith, R.W., 1969. Financial Structure and Development (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 
Goldstein, M., Kaminsky G. and C. Reinhart, 2000. Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System 
for Emerging Markets (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics) 
Gourinchas, P.O., Landerretche, O. and R. Valdés, 2001. Lending Booms: Latin America and the World, Economia 
1(2),  47-99. 
Harding, D. and A. Pagan, 2002. Dissecting the Cycle: A Methodological Investigation. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 49(2), 365-81. 
Hoelscher, D. and M. Quintyn, 2003. Managing Systemic Banking Crises. IMF Occasional Paper 224, Washington 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Jácome, L., 2008. Central Bank Involvement in Banking Crises in Latin America. IMF Working Paper 135, May, 
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Jonung, L. and T. Hagberg, 2002. How Costly Was the Crisis of the 1990s? A Comparison of Finland and Sweden’s 
Deepest Crises. Paper presented at the conference entitled “Sweden and Finland: Economic Interaction, Processes 
and Comparisons”,  Työväen Akatemia, Kauniainen, September. 
Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S. and C. Reinhart, 1998. Leading Indicators of Currency Crisis. IMF Staff Papers 45(1), 1-
14.  
Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart, 1999. The Twin Crises: Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems. 
American Economic Review 89(3), 473-500. 
King, R.G. and R. Levine, 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108(3),  717-37 
King, R. G. and R. Levine, 1994. Capital Fundamentalism, Economic Development, and Economic Growth. 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40(1), 259-92. 
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore, 1997. Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 211-48. 
Krugman, P.,1999. Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises. International Tax and Public 
Finance 6(4), 459-72.  
Kumar, M., Moorthy, U. and W. Perraudin, 2003. Predicting Emerging Market Currency Crashes. Journal of 
Empirical Finance 10, 427–54. 
Levine, R., Loayza, N. and T. Beck, 2000. Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 46(1), 31-77. 
McKinnon, R. and H. Pill, 1996. Credible Liberalizations and International Capital Flows: The Overborrowing 
Syndrome, in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds., Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press) 7-42. 
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales, 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review 88(3), 559-86. 
Reinhart, C.M., 2002. Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings. World Bank Economic Review 
16(2), 151–170. 
Reinhart, C. M. and K.S. Rogoff, 2008. Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace. NBER Working Paper 
14587, December, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Sachs, J.D, Tornell, A. and A. Velasco, 1996. Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 147–215. 
Tornell, A. and F. Westermann, 2003. The Credit Channel in Middle Income Countries. CESifo Working Paper 960.22
ECB
















TC→ TC +2 








TC→ TC +2 

























































1989 (CK, B)  
- 
- 











































































































Moldova             
2003 -  - 

















      Netherlands  1988 -  - 





































































Bulgaria             
2003    


















1984* 1984  - 






































Working Paper Series No 1094
September 2009




















































































Costa Rica  
1983 
1998 











































































South Africa    
 






















1994 (J),  





































































































1991 (KR, CK, B, JH) 














































Georgia              
2005    



























1983 (KR, CK, B) 
- 
1996 (R, CK, B) 
- 























Working Paper Series No 1094
September 2009



















Guinea-Bissau     
1993** 
1998 





























1992 (CK, B),  
1994 (CK, B),  
- 
- 


















































































1992 (KR),  
1997 (CK) 















































   
   











with the following notations for the banking crises sources: CK=Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), KR=Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), J=Jácome (2008), JH=Jonung and Hagberg (2002), R=Reinhart (2002), B=Bordo et al. (2001), compiled by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008)), IMF = IMF programme during the global crisis. * denotes a currency crisis ** a banking crisis and *** a twin 
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